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ABSTRACT
We construct an equally-weighted index of commodity futures monthly returns over the period
between July of 1959 and March of 2004 in order to study simple properties of commodity futures
as an asset class. Fully-collateralized commodity futures have historically offered the same return
and Sharpe ratio as equities. While the risk premium on commodity futures is essentially the same
as equities, commodity futures returns are negatively correlated with equity returns and bond
returns. The negative correlation between commodity futures and the other asset classes is due, in
significant part, to different behavior over the business cycle. In addition, commodity futures are













Commodity futures are still a relatively unknown asset class, despite being traded in the 
U.S. for over 100 years and elsewhere for even longer.
1 This may be because commodity 
futures are strikingly different from stocks, bonds, and other conventional assets. Among 
these differences are: (1) commodity futures are derivative securities; they are not claims 
on long-lived corporations; (2) they are short maturity claims on real assets; (3) unlike 
financial assets, many commodities have pronounced seasonality in price levels and 
volatilities.  Another reason that commodity futures are relatively unknown may be more 
prosaic, namely, there is a paucity of data.
2 
 
The economic function of corporate securities such as stocks and bonds, that is, liabilities 
of firms, is to raise external resources for the firm.  Investors are bearing the risk that the 
future cash flows of the firm may be low and may occur during bad times, like 
recessions.  These claims represent the discounted value of cash flows over very long 
horizons. Their value depends on decisions of management.  Investors are compensated 
for these risks.  Commodity futures are quite different; they do not raise resources for 
firms to invest.  Rather, commodity futures allow firms to obtain insurance for the future 
value of their outputs (or inputs).  Investors in commodity futures receive compensation 
for bearing the risk of short-term commodity price fluctuations. 
 
Commodity futures do not represent direct exposures to actual commodities. Futures 
prices represent bets on the expected future spot price. Inventory decisions link current 
and future scarcity of the commodity and consequently provide a connection between the 
spot price and the expected future spot price. But commodities, and hence commodity 
futures, display many differences. Some commodities are storable and some are not; 
some are input goods and some are intermediate goods. 
 
In this paper we produce some stylized facts about commodity futures and address some 
commonly raised questions: Can an investment in commodity futures earn a positive 
return when spot commodity prices are falling? How do spot and futures returns 
compare?  What are the returns to investing in commodity futures, and how do these 
returns compare to investing in stocks and bonds? Are commodity futures riskier than 
stocks?  Do commodity futures provide a hedge against inflation? Can commodity futures 
provide diversification to other asset classes?  Many of these questions have been 
investigated by others but in large part with short data series applying to only a small 
number of commodities.
3  In this paper we construct a monthly time series of an equally-
weighted index of commodity futures starting in 1959.  We focus on an index because we 
want to address the above questions with respect to this asset class as a whole, rather than 
                                                           
1 Financial futures were traded on shares of the Dutch East India Company in the 17
th century (Jonker and 
Gelderblom (2005)), but modern futures markets appear to have their origin in Japanese rice futures, which 
were traded in Osaka starting in the early 18
th century; see Anderson, et al. (2001). 
2 For example, the University of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices has no commodity futures 
data, nor does Ibbotson Associates. In addition, the well-known commodity futures indices either do not 
extend back very far or cannot be reproduced for various reasons. 
3 Exceptions include Bodie and Rosansky (1980), Kolb (1992), Fama and French (1987) and Greer (2000). 
  2with respect to individual commodity futures. We produce some stylized facts to 
characterize commodity futures.   
 
 
 2.  The Mechanics of an Investment in Commodity Futures 
 
A commodity futures contract is an agreement to buy (or sell) a specified quantity of a 
commodity at a future date, at a price agreed upon when entering into the contract – the 
futures price. The futures price is different from the value of a futures contract. Upon 
entering a futures contract, no cash changes hands between buyers and sellers – and 
hence the value of the contract is zero at its inception.
4 
 
How then is the futures price determined? Think of the alternative to obtaining the 
commodity in the future: simply wait and purchase the commodity in the future spot 
market. Because the future spot price is unknown today, a futures contract is a way to 
lock in the terms of trade for future transactions.  In determining the fair futures price, 
market participants will compare the current futures price to the spot price that can be 
expected to prevail at the maturity of the futures contract. In other words, futures markets 
are forward looking and the futures price will embed expectations about the future spot 
price. If spot prices are expected to be much higher at the maturity of the futures contract 
than they are today, the current futures price will be set at a high level relative to the 
current spot price. Lower expected spot prices in the future will be reflected in a low 
current futures price.  (See Black (1976).) 
 
Because foreseeable trends in spot markets are taken into account when the futures prices 
are set, expected movements in the spot price are not a source of return to an investor in 
futures. Futures investors will benefit when the spot price at maturity turns out to be 
higher than expected when they entered into the contract, and lose when the spot price is 
lower than anticipated. A futures contract is therefore a bet on the future spot price, and 
by entering into a futures contract an investor assumes the risk of unexpected movements 
in the future spot price. Unexpected deviations from the expected future spot price are by 
definition unpredictable, and should average out to zero over time for an investor in 
futures, unless the investor has an ability to correctly time the market. 
 
What return can an investor in futures expect to earn if he does not benefit from expected 
spot price movements, and is unable to outsmart the market?  The answer is the risk 
premium: the difference between the current futures price and the expected future spot 
price. If today’s futures price is set below the expected future spot price, a purchaser of 
futures will on average earn money. If the futures price is set above the expected future 
spot price, a seller of futures will earn a risk premium. 
 
Are there any theoretical reasons for the risk premium to accrue to either buyers or sellers 
of futures contracts? Keynes’ (1930) and Hicks’ (1939) theory of normal backwardation 
postulated that the risk premium would on average accrue to the buyers of futures. They 
                                                           
4 This is also true at the end of each day when the value of a futures contract is reset to be zero.  Gains and 
losses during the day are settled by the two parties to the contract via transfers from their margin accounts. 
  3envisioned a world in which producers of commodities would seek to hedge the price risk 
of their output. For example, a producer of grain would sell grain futures to lock in the 
future price of his crops and obtain insurance against the price risk of grain at harvest 
time. Speculators would provide this insurance and buy futures, but demand a futures 
price which is below the spot price that could be expected to prevail at the maturity of the 
futures contract. By “backwardating” the futures price relative to the expected future spot 




How is the risk premium earned? Do speculators have to hold the futures contract until 
expiration? The answer is no. Over time, as the maturity date of the futures contract 
draws close, the futures price will start to approach the spot price of a commodity. At 
maturity, the futures contract will become equivalent to a spot contract, and the futures 
price will equal the spot price. If futures prices were initially set below the expected 
future spot price, the futures price will gradually increase over time, rewarding the long 
position. 
 
Whether the theory of normal backwardation is an accurate theory of the determination of 
the futures price is an empirical matter, and much of this paper will be devoted to 
examining the existence of a risk premium in commodity futures.
6 The above discussion 
of the mechanics of futures markets, however, serves to make the following important 
points about an investment in futures: 
 
1.  The expected payoff to a futures position is the risk premium. The realized payoff 
is the risk premium plus any unexpected deviation of the future spot price from 
the expected future spot price 
 
2.  A long position in futures is expected to earn positive (excess) returns as long as 
the futures price is set below the expected future spot price. 
 
3.  If the futures price is set below the expected future spot price, the futures prices 
will tend to rise over time, providing a return to investors in futures. 
 
4.  Expected trends in spot prices are not a source of return to an investor in futures. 
 
To further illustrate these points, consider a stylized example, adapted from Weiser 
(2003).  The example is displayed in Figure 1 below.  Assume that the spot price of oil is 
$30 a barrel and that market participants expect the price of oil to be $27 in three months. 
In order to entice investors into the market, the futures price is set at $25, which is a 
                                                           
5 Keynes (1930, p. 144) put it this way: “In other words, the quoted forward price, though above the present 
spot price, must fall below the anticipated future spot price by at least the amount of normal 
backwardation.” 
6 Attempts to empirically measure the risk premium have yielded mixed results for individual commodities 
(see for example, Gray (1961), Dusak (1973), Jagannathan (1985), Bessembinder (1992), and Kolb (1992)).  
Part of the reason for the lack of success is no doubt the volatility of futures prices, and motivates our focus 
on the properties of a diversified index, in the spirit of Bodie and Rosansky (1980).  
 
  4discount to the expected future spot price. The difference between the futures price and 
the expected future spot price, or $2, is the risk premium that the investor expects to earn 
for assuming short-term price risk. 
 
Now suppose that at the time the contract expires, oil is trading at the expected price of 
$27.  An investor in physical commodities, who cares about the direction of spot prices, 
has just lost $3 (i.e., $30 - $27).  An investor in the futures contract, however, would have 
gained the difference between the final spot price of $27 and the initial futures price of 
$25, or $2. 
 
The example above and the figure examine the case where the expected future spot price 
of $27 is, in fact, realized.  But suppose the expectation of a price of $27 is not realized 
and instead the final spot price turns out to be $26.  Then the realized return to the 
investor would be $1. This realized return can be broken down into the risk premium 
($27 - $25 = $2), less the difference between the final spot price and the expected price 
($26 - $25 = $1). 
 
Figure 1: Futures versus Spot returns 
Inception(t) Expiration(T)
Investor Expects to Earn 
the Risk Premium ($2)
Market Participants 




 Converge at Expiration
Expected Spot Price at Expiration






The remainder of the paper will be devoted to empirical evidence on the historical 
performance of commodity futures as an asset class. One final remark needs to be made 
regarding the calculation of futures returns. At the beginning of this section, we explained 
that the value of a futures contract is zero at origination, and does not require any cash 
outlays for either the long or the short position. In practice, both the long and short 
position will have to post collateral that can be used to settle gains and losses on the 
futures position over time. The collateral is typically only a fraction of the notional value 
  5of the futures position, which implies that a futures position can involve substantial 
leverage. 
 
In order to draw a meaningful comparison between the performance of futures and other 
asset classes, we need to control for leverage when calculating futures returns. We make 
the assumption that futures positions will be fully collateralized. When an investor buys a 
contract with a futures price of $25, we will assume that the investor simultaneously 
invests $25 in T-bills. The total return earned by the investor over a given time period, 
will therefore be the change in the futures price and the interest on the $25 (calculated 
daily), scaled by the $25 initial investment. 
 
 
3.  An Equally-Weighted Index of Commodity Futures 
 
To investigate the long-term return to commodity futures we constructed an equally-
weighted performance index of commodity futures.  The source of our data is a database 
maintained by the Commodities Research Bureau, which has daily prices for individual 
futures contracts since 1959. We append this with data from the London Metals 
Exchange. A detailed description of the data is given in Appendix 1, but a few general 
comments are in place. 
 
Our index potentially suffers from a variety of selection and survivorship biases. First, 
the CRB database mostly contains data for futures contracts that have survived until 
today, or were in existence for extended periods during the 1959-2004 period. Many 
contracts that were introduced during this period, but failed to survive, are not included in 
the database. It is not clear how survivorship bias affects the computed returns to a 
futures investment. Futures contracts fail for lack of interest by market participants, i.e. 
lack of trading volume (Black (1986) and Carlton (1984)). While this may be correlated 
with the presence of a risk premium, the direction of the bias is not as clear cut as would 
be the case of the calculation of an equity index. Among other reasons, stocks do not 
survive because of bankruptcy, and excluding bankrupt firms would create a strong 
upward bias in the computed returns. Second, in order to avoid double counting of 
commodities, we selected contracts from a single exchange for inclusion in our index, 
even though a commodity might be traded on multiple exchanges. We based our selection 
on the liquidity of the contract, and it is therefore subject to a selection bias that may or 
may not be correlated with the computed returns.  Finally, for each commodity, there are 
multiple contracts listed that differ by maturity. On each day, we selected the contract 
with the nearest expiration date (the shortest contract) for our index, unless the contract 
expired in that month, in which case we would roll into the next contract. In each month, 
we therefore hold the shortest futures contract that will not expire in that month.
7 
 
                                                           
7 The rolling itself is not a source of return. Because the futures price adjusts continuously, and gains and 
losses are settled daily, a futures contract has zero value at the end of each day. Even though a distant 
futures contract may have a different futures price than a near contract, the exchange of one for another has 
no cash flow implications. 
  6The performance index is computed as follows: at the beginning of each month we hold 
one dollar in each commodity futures contract. (If the futures price is $25, we hold 1/25
th 
of a contract). At the same time we purchase $1 in T-bills for every contract that the 
index invests in. The index is therefore “fully collateralized” by a position of T-bills. The 
contracts are held until the end of the month, at which time we rebalance the index to 
equal weights.  More detail is contained in Appendix 1. 
We are not the first to construct an index to study commodities at the portfolio level. 
Bodie and Rosansky (1980) construct an equally-weighted index using quarterly data 
between 1950 and 1976.  Fama and French (1987) report average monthly excess returns 
for 21 commodities as well as on an equally-weighted portfolio. Greer (2000) studies a 
commercially available index between 1970 and 1999. The advantage of studying 
commodities at the portfolio level is that diversification helps to reduce the noise inherent 
in individual commodities data. Among other things, this noise may obscure the 
detection of a risk premium. 
 
There are many different ways in which we could have weighted individual commodity 
futures in our index.
8 By analyzing the returns of an equally-weighted index of 
commodity futures we can make statements about “how the average commodity future 
behaves during the average time period.” Monthly re-balancing to equal weights embeds 
a trading strategy that might influence the performance of the index. Below we provide 
some evidence on how the index returns are influenced by our re-balancing assumption. 
 
 
4.  The Historical Returns on Commodities: Spot Prices, Collateralized Futures, and 
Inflation 
 
We now turn to the empirical evidence on spot and future returns.  What is the average 
return to commodity futures? Does the collateralized futures position outperform the spot 
return for the “average commodity future”? Figure 2a compares the equally-weighted 
total return index of commodity futures to an equally-weighted portfolio of spot 
commodities between 1959 and 2004.
9  Both indices have been adjusted for inflation by 
deflating each series by the consumer price index (CPI). The index of commodity spot 
prices simply tracks the evolution of the spot prices, and ignores all costs associated with 
the holding of physical commodities (storage, insurance, etc). It is therefore an upper 
bound on the return that an investor in spot commodities would have earned. The main 
conclusions from examination of the figure are that: 
 
1.  There are large differences between the historical performance of spot commodity 
prices and collateralized commodity futures returns.  The historical return to an  
                                                           
8 The popular traded indices of collateralized commodity futures sometimes use (a combination of) 
production and liquidity data as the basis for calculating weights (e.g., the Dow Jones AIG Commodity 
Index and the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index). The Reuters-CRB index uses equal weights, but does not 
rebalance like our index. 
9 See Appendix 1 for a discussion of how spot prices are constructed from futures prices.  Given the spot 
prices, the equally-weighted spot commodity prices are then constructed to exactly mimic the equally 
weighted index of commodity futures.   
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Figure 2a 
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investment in commodity futures has far exceeded the return to a holder of spot 
commodities. 
 
2.  The equal-weighted indices of both commodity spot and commodity futures 
prices have outpaced inflation. 
 
What is perhaps not directly apparent from Figure 2a is that the return on the futures 
position is highly correlated with movements in the spot.  As explained in Section 2, an 
investment in commodity futures benefits from unexpected increases in spot prices. 
Especially in times of high spot market volatility, the returns to spot and futures will be 
highly correlated. This is illustrated in Figure 2b. It presents the same data as Figure 2a of 
the graph, but the scale is in logs, which facilitates identification of proportional changes 
in series that differ in levels. What is clear from Figure 2b is that the two series are highly 
correlated, but diverge because of differing trends. Expected trends in the spot price are 
excluded from the futures index, which rises with the risk free rate plus any risk premium 
earned by the futures position.  
 
Figure 2a also gives a clue about the magnitude of the risk premium of commodity 
futures. Part of the return to collateralized futures is the return on collateral (T-bills). 
Because the historical inflation adjusted return to T-bills is about the rate of inflation, the 
(inflation adjusted) real return to collateralized commodity futures is an indication of the 
risk premium earned by investors. We will return to a discussion of the risk premium in 
the next section.  
 
How robust are our conclusions about spot and futures prices to our method of index 
construction? The return of a frequently re-balanced index will differ from a buy-and-
hold strategy if returns are not independently distributed over time.
10 In particular, our 
equal-weighted index has an embedded trading strategy, which at the end of each month 
effectively buys a portion of those commodities that went down in price and sells a 
portion of those commodities that went up in price. If there are temporary spikes in 
commodity prices that partially revert during the next month, re-balancing to equal 
weights has the effect of buying future winners and selling future losers. This would lead 
a re-balanced index to outperform a buy-and-hold index. 
 
Temporary price movements can be pronounced in spot markets, because many spot 
commodity prices exhibit seasonal price fluctuations. For example, heating oil prices are 
on average higher during the winter months, and gasoline prices increase during the 
summer driving season. Seasonality in spot prices is not likely to influence futures returns 
because they represent foreseeable fluctuations that are taken into account when market 
participants set futures prices. There may be separate factors that drive temporary price 
movements in futures returns, but this is a question that is beyond the scope of the current 
paper. 
 
                                                           
10 See for example Blume and Stambaugh (1983), and Roll (1983). 
  9Table 1 summarizes the annualized average returns – arithmetic and geometric – of our 
commodity index, under different assumptions about rebalancing.  (Appendix 1 provides 
the formulas corresponding to the return calculations in Table 1.) The second column 
reports results for an index that rebalances annually to equal weights.
11 The last column 




Table 1: Average Annualized Returns to Spot Commodities 
and Collateralized Commodity Futures 1959/7 – 2004/12 
 
   Rebalancing 
Average Return % p.a.  Index  Monthly  Annual  Buy and hold 
      
Futures  10.69 11.97 11.46 
Spot  8.42 7.51 4.64  Arithmetic 
Inflation 4.14     
      
Futures 9.98  11.18  10.31 
Spot  7.66 6.66 3.47  Geometric 
Inflation 4.13     
 
1.  The table shows that the average returns of a monthly re-balanced futures index 
and an index that does not rebalance are very similar, and somewhat lower than 
an index that annually rebalances to equal weights.
13 
 
2.  Consistent with our previous conjecture, the frequency of rebalancing has a larger 
influence on the spot index returns than the futures returns, and has the effect of 
lowering the spot returns. The influence is especially large for the buy-and-hold 
index which does not rebalance.  
 
3.  The geometric average buy-and-hold spot return of 3.47% per annum is lower 
than the average inflation of 4.15% over the sample period, which is consistent 
with the common “wisdom” that over the long-term commodity prices have not 
kept pace with inflation.
14   
                                                           
11 To avoid the potential sensitivity of our results to the particular month of the year in which this index 
rebalances, we report the average return across 12 indices, each of which rebalances annually in a different 
month of the year. This procedure was suggested by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) in the context of 
momentum strategies. 
12 At the beginning of the sample, commodities enter the index with equal weight. When a new futures 
contract becomes available, we set its weight to the average of the other commodities, but the relative 
positions of the original commodities are not rebalanced.  For example, if the index currently has 19 
commodities and an additional commodity becomes available, we sell 1/20 of our index and invest the 
proceeds in the 20
th commodity. 
13 Throughout the paper, averages of monthly returns are annualized by multiplying the raw average returns 
by 1200.  
14 See Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950), and more recently Grilli and Yang (1988) and Cashin and 
McDermott (2002). 
  10We conclude that our estimate of the average return on commodity futures is robust to 
different assumptions about rebalancing. Rebalancing matters particularly for the 
calculation of average spot returns. In the remainder of the paper we will report results 
for our monthly re-balanced equal-weighted index. 
 
 
5.  The Risk and Return of Commodity Futures Compared with Other Asset Classes 
 
Figure 3 compares the cumulative performance of the Ibbotson corporate bond total 
return index (“Bonds”), the SP500 total return index (Stocks), and the equally-weighted 
commodity futures index total return (“Commodity Futures”) for the period July 1959 to 
the end of 2004.  All series have been deflated by the CPI index, and therefore measure 
the inflation-adjusted performance of the three asset classes. 
 
Figure 3 shows: 
 
1.  Over the last 45 years, the average annualized return to a collateralized 
investment in commodity futures has been comparable to the return on the SP500. 
Both outperformed corporate bonds. 
 
2.  Stocks and Commodity Futures have experienced higher volatility than Bonds. 
 
3.  Commodity Futures outperformed stocks during the 1970s, but this performance 
was reversed during the 1990s 
Figure 3 
Stocks, Bonds, and Commodity Futures
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Table 2 summarizes the historical risk premiums (not adjusted for inflation) for the three 
asset classes. The t-statistic measures the confidence that the average risk premium is 
different from zero. 
 
Table 2: Risk Premium of Commodity Futures, Stocks and Bonds 
Annualized Monthly Returns 1959/7 – 2004/12 
 
  Commodity 
Futures  Stocks Bonds 
Average   5.23 5.65 2.22 
Standard Deviation  12.10 14.85  8.47 
T-statistic  2.92 2.57 1.77 
Sharpe ratio  0.43 0.38 0.26 
% returns > 0  55 57 54 
 
 
Two observations stand out: 
 
1.  The average historical risk premium of Commodity Futures has been about 5% per 
annum during the period from 1959 to 2004. The average premium is significant in a 
statistical sense (t-statistic = 2.92). 
 
2.  The historical risk premium of Commodity Futures is about equal to the risk premium 
of Stocks, and is more than double the risk premium of Bonds. 
 
As pointed out in Section 2, there has been much debate among economists about the 
existence of a risk premium in commodity futures. Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1939) 
assumed that hedgers outnumber speculators in the futures markets, which was the basis 
for the theory of normal backwardation.  The estimate of the risk premium in Table 2 is 
consistent with this theory, and is in line with previous studies that have estimated the 
risk premium at the portfolio level.
15 Most importantly, Table 2 shows that the risk 
premium has been economically large and statistically significant. Our commodity 
futures total return index covers a period of more than 45 years, and is diversified across 
many commodities. As such it provides a unique opportunity to examine the risk 
premium across a variety of commodities and time periods.  
 
It is perhaps important to point out that the risk premium is measured as the arithmetic 
average of the commodity futures excess returns. It measures the average rate at which 
                                                           
15 Bodie and Rosansky (1980) report an average excess return of 9.5% per annum for an equally weighted 
portfolio of commodity futures between 1950 and 1976. Fama and French (1987) report a continuously 
compounded risk premium of 0.45% (t=1.57) per month on an equally weighted portfolio of 21 commodity 
futures between 1966 and 1984.  
  12the futures price rises over the life of the average contract. This measure of the premium 
is consistent with the definition of risk aversion in the finance literature.
16 
 
Table 3 summarizes the distribution of monthly returns of stocks, bonds and commodity 
futures. The second row shows that the historical volatility of the equally-weighted 
commodity futures total return has been below volatility of the SP500, which explains the 
slightly higher historical Sharpe Ratio of commodity futures in Table 2.  The next two 
rows illustrate that financial returns are not completely characterized by the mean and 
standard deviation of returns. (Appendix 3 contains similar summary statistics for the 
individual commodities.) 
 
Table 3: Monthly Returns of Commodity Futures, Stocks and Bonds 
Distribution of Percentage Returns 1959/7-2004/12 
 
  Commodity 
Futures  Stocks Bonds 
Average Return  0.89 0.93 0.64 
Standard Deviation  3.47 4.27 2.45 
Skewness  0.71 -0.34 0.37 
Kurtosis  4.53 1.81 3.56 
 
As is well known, the returns on financial returns often deviate from a normal 
distribution, display skewness, and have “fat tails.”  Table 3 shows that this is also true of 
commodities:  commodity futures returns are positively skewed while stock returns are 
skewed negatively. In addition, commodities display relatively high kurtosis indicating 
more realizations in the tails than would be expected based on a normal distribution.
17 
This is further illustrated in Figure 4, which compares the empirical distribution of 
monthly returns for the SP500 and our equally-weighted commodity futures index 
between 1959 and 2004.  
 
Three observations stand out: 
 
1.  Commodity Futures and Stocks have about the same average return, but the 
standard deviation of stock returns is slightly higher. 
 
2.  The return distribution of equities has negative skewness, while the distribution of 
commodity returns has positive skewness. This means that, proportionally, 
                                                           
16 Kolb (1992), Erb and Harvey (2005), and others evaluate normal backwardation by the average 
geometric or average log return on the futures position. This is equivalent to asking whether an investor 
with log utility who invested his entire wealth would have been better off faced with the average futures 
payoffs. Because a log investor is risk averse, this amounts to measuring the premium relative to a log (i.e. 
risk averse) investor. We thank Jon Ingersoll for pointing this out to us. 
17 To a large extent, the index returns inherit the properties of individual commodity returns which are 
skewed right and exhibit excess kurtosis. See Appendix 3. 
  13equities have more weight in the left tail of the return distribution while 
Commodity Futures have more weight in the right tail.  
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The slightly higher variance and negative skewness of equities implies that equities have 
more downside risk relative to commodity futures. For example, the 5% tail of the 
empirical distribution of equities occurs at –6.34% compared to –4.10% for commodity 
futures. In terms of Value-at-Risk, the maximum loss on equity has been substantially 
exceeded the loss of a commodity futures investment.  From the perspective of risk 
management, an important question is whether these tail events occur simultaneously for 
both assets, or in isolation. We will turn to the question of correlation next. 
 
 
6.  The Correlation of Commodity Futures with Other Asset Classes 
 
We examine the correlation of commodity futures returns with stocks and bonds over 
various investment horizons. In addition to monthly returns, we report correlations 
computed using overlapping returns over quarterly, annual and 5-year intervals. Because 
asset returns are volatile, examining correlation over longer holding periods may reveal 
patterns in the data that are obscured by short-term price fluctuations. Table 4 illustrates 
the correlations of commodity futures returns with stocks, bonds, and inflation over the 
period between 1959 and 2004.  
  14     Table 4  
 
Correlation of Commodity Futures Returns with Stocks, Bonds, and Inflation 
Overlapping Return Data 1959/7 – 2004/12 
 
 Stocks  Bonds  Inflation 












A “*” next to a coefficient indicates that the correlation is significant at the 5% level using Newey-West 
corrected standard errors. 
 
Table 4 shows that: 
 
1.  Over all horizons – except monthly – the equally-weighted commodity futures 
total return is negatively correlated with the return on the SP500 and long-term 
bonds. While it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the correlation of 
Commodity Futures with Stocks is zero at short horizons, these findings suggest 
that Commodity Futures are effective in diversifying equity and bond portfolios. 
 
2.  The negative correlation of Commodity Futures with Stocks and Bonds tends to 
increase with the holding period. This suggests that the diversification benefits of 
Commodity Futures tend to be larger at longer horizons. 
 
3.  Commodity Futures returns are positively correlated with inflation and the 
correlation is larger at longer horizons. Because Commodity Futures returns are 
volatile relative to inflation, longer-term correlations better capture the inflation-
properties of a commodity investment. 
 
Figure 4 showed that equities contain more downside risk than commodity futures. So it 
is important to ask whether the negative correlation between equities and commodity 
futures holds up when equity returns are low – a time when diversification is especially 
valuable. We examined the returns to commodity futures during the months of lowest 
equity returns. The results are given in Figure 5a and 5b. Figure 5a shows the equity 
returns during the 5% of months of poorest performance of equity markets. Figure 8b 
concentrates on the lowest 1% of realized equity returns.  
 
The figures show the following: 
 
1.  During the 5% of the months of worst performance of equity markets, when 
stocks fell on average by 8.98% per month, commodity futures experienced a 
positive return of 1.03%, which is slightly above the full sample average return of 
0.89% per month. 
 
  15Figure 5: Conditional Commodity Futures Returns When Stock Returns are Low 
Bottom 5% Equities Returns 
Average Equities Return
 in Tail = – 8.98%
– 6.34%
mean = 0.93 %
stdev = 4.27 %
 
Average Commodities Return 
Conditional on Low Equity Returns = 1.03 %
Average Commodities Return 
Conditional on Low Equity Returns = 1.03 %
Average Commodities Return




Bottom 5 % of Equities Returns: 
Average Equities Return in Tail =  – 8.98%
Bottom 1% of Equities Returns: 
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2.  During the 1% of months of lowest performance of equity markets, when equities 
fell on average by 13.87% per month, commodity futures returned an average of 
2.36%. 
 
It seems that the diversification benefits of commodity futures work well when they are 
needed most.
18 Consistent with a negative correlation, commodity futures earn above 
average returns when stocks earn below average returns. 
 
For symmetry, we also examined the situation in which commodity markets have their 
poorest performance. The average return to equity in the bottom 5% (1%) months in 
terms of commodity market performance was -0.99 % (-4.10%) per month.  
 
 
7.  Commodity Futures Returns and Inflation 
 
Investors ultimately care about the real purchasing power of their returns, which means 
that the threat of inflation is a concern for investors. Many traditional asset classes are a 
poor hedge against inflation – at least over short and medium-term horizons.  
 
Bonds are nominally denominated assets, and their yields are set to compensate investors 
for expected inflation over the life of the bond.  When inflation is unexpectedly higher 
than the level investors contracted for, the real purchasing power of the cash flows will 
fall short of expectations.  To the extent that unexpected inflation leads to revisions of 
future expected inflation, this loss of real purchasing power can be significant. 
 
There are reasons to expect equities to provide a better hedge than bonds against inflation 
– at least in theory.  After all, stocks represent claims against real assets, such as 
factories, equipment, and inventories, whose value can be expected to hold pace with the 
general price level. However, firms also have contracts with suppliers of inputs, labor and 
capital, that are fixed in nominal terms and hence act very much like nominal bonds. In 
addition, (unexpected) inflation is often not neutral for the real economy. Unexpected 
inflation is associated with negative shocks to aggregate output, which is generally bad 
news for equities (see Fama (1981)). In sum, the extent to which stocks provide a hedge 
against inflation is an empirical matter.  
 
Table 4 suggested that commodity futures might be a better inflation hedge than stocks or 
bonds. First, because commodity futures represent a bet on commodity prices, they are 
directly linked to the components of inflation. Second, because futures prices include 
information about foreseeable trends in commodity prices, they rise and fall with 
unexpected deviations from components of inflation. In summary, the opposite exposure 
to (unexpected) inflation may help to explain why futures do well when stocks and bonds 
perform poorly. 
                                                           
18 The average returns during 1% of the months in the sample need to be interpreted with caution, as they 
are computed only over six observations. 
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Table 5 compares the correlations of stocks, bonds, and commodity futures with inflation. 
As before, correlations are computed over various investment horizons.  
 
Table 5: 
Correlation of Assets with Inflation 1959/7 – 2004/12 
 








1 – year  -0.19  -0.32
* 0.29
* 
5 – year  -0.25  -0.22  0.45
* 
 
A “*” next to a coefficient indicates that the correlation is significant at the 5% level using Newey-West 
corrected standard errors. 
 
Several observations stand out from Table 5: 
 
1.  Commodity Futures have an opposite exposure to inflation compared to Stocks and 
Bonds. Stocks and Bonds are negatively correlated with inflation, while the 
correlation of Commodity Futures with inflation is positive at all horizons, and 
statistically significant at the longer horizons.  
 
2.  In absolute magnitude, inflation correlations tend to increase with the holding period. 
The negative inflation correlation of Stocks and Bonds and the positive inflation 
correlation of Commodity Futures are larger at return intervals of 1 and 5 years than 
at the monthly or quarterly frequency. 
 
Our previous discussion suggested that stocks, and especially bonds, can be sensitive to 
unexpected inflation. In order to measure unexpected inflation, a model of expected 
inflation is needed.  For this purpose we choose a very simple method that has been used 
by others in the past (e.g., see Fama and Schwert (1977) and Schwert (1981)).  The short-
term T-bill rate is a proxy for the market’s expectation of inflation, if the expected real 
rate of interest is constant over time. Consequently, unexpected inflation can be measured 
as the actual inflation rate minus the nominal interest rate (which was known ex ante).   
 
Because inflation is persistent over time, unexpected inflation often causes market 
participants to revise their estimates of future expected inflation. The change in expected 
inflation can be measured by the change in the nominal interest rate. This is not 
necessarily perfectly correlated with the unexpected inflation rate since investors may use 
more information than just the current rate of inflation to revise their expectations of 
future inflation.
19 
                                                           
19 Following the large literature on inflationary expectations, we choose the 90-day T-bill yield as our 
measure of expected inflation for the next quarter. See Fama and Schwert (1977) and Schwert (1981) for 
discussions  
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Table 6 illustrates the correlations of Stocks, Bonds, and Commodity Futures returns with 
the components of inflation. These observations stand out: 
 
1.  The negative sensitivities of Stocks and Bonds to inflation stem mainly from 
sensitivities to unexpected inflation. The correlations with unexpected inflation 
exceed the raw inflation correlations.  
 
2.  Commodity Futures are also more sensitive to unexpected inflation, but (again) in 
the opposite direction.  
 
3.  Stock returns and (especially) bond returns are negatively influenced by revisions 
about future expected inflation. Revisions about future inflationary expectations 
are a positive influence on commodity futures returns. 
 
Table 6:  





















A “*” next to a coefficient indicates that the correlation is significant at the 5% level using Newey-West 
corrected standard errors. 
 
Commodity futures returns are negatively correlated with stock returns. Commodity 
futures have opposite exposures to unexpected inflation from stocks and bonds. It is 
tempting to put both together and ask: does the opposite exposure to unexpected inflation 
account for the negative correlation between commodity futures and stocks and bonds? 
Preliminary findings suggest that this is only part of the story behind the negative 
correlations. If we isolate the portion of the returns of commodity futures, stocks and 
bonds that is unrelated to unexpected inflation and examine the correlations again, we 
find that the residual variation of commodity futures and stocks or bonds continue to be 
negatively correlated.
20 At the quarterly horizon, the correlation between futures and 
stocks increases from –0.06 to 0, while for bonds the correlation increases from –0.27 to 
–0.20. In other words there appear to be additional factors that drive the negative 
correlation between futures returns and stocks and bonds.  The next section describes one 
of these sources: business cycle variation. 
 
 
                                                           
20 In other words, we examine the correlation of regression residuals from regressions of each asset class’ 
returns on unexpected inflation. 
  198. Commodity Futures Returns over the Business Cycle. 
 
Modern finance theory identifies two components to asset returns: a systematic 
component and a nonsystematic, or idiosyncratic, component.  Holding a portfolio of 
many different securities can diversify idiosyncratic components.  But, the systematic 
component corresponds to movements in the market as a whole, and so is viewed as 
nondiversifiable.  The nondiversifiable component, associated with beta in the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model, also corresponds to the business cycle since business cycle risk is 
nondiversifiable.  Stock and bond returns are negative in (the early phase of) recessions, 
in particular. 
 
Commodity future returns and equity returns are negatively correlated at quarterly, 
annual, and five-year horizons.  This means that commodity futures are useful in creating 
diversified portfolios, with respect to the idiosyncratic component of returns. 
 
But, importantly, there is also evidence of another “diversification effect.” Commodity 
futures have a feature quite unique to this asset class, namely, commodity futures have 
some power at diversifying the systematic component of risk – the part that is not 
supposed to be diversifiable!  Weiser (2003) reports that commodity futures returns vary 
with the stage of the business cycle.
21 In particular commodity futures perform well in the 
early stages of a recession, a time when stock returns generally disappoint. In later stages 
of recessions, commodity returns fall off, but this is generally a very good time for 
equities. 
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21 Weiser (2003) looks at the period 1970-2003, and determines business cycle dating in terms of the rate of 
change of the quarterly GDP growth rate. Vrugt (2003) also analyzes the period 1970-2003.  He uses 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) business cycle dating, and divides the business cycle into 
phases.  We have used Vrugt’s (2003) figure to show the phases. Jensen et al. (2002) examine variation in 
commodities returns conditional on interest rates. 
  20Figure 6 displays a business cycle, where the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) peak and trough are identified.
22 The NBER identifies peaks and troughs, but the 
figure further divides the cycle into phases.  Phases are identified by dividing the number 
of months from peak to trough (trough to peak) into equal halves to indicate Early 
Recession and Late Recession (Early Expansion and Late Expansion).  Clearly, the Early 
and Late Expansion phases correspond to an economic expansion, while the Early and 
Late Recession phases correspond to a recession. Starting in 1959 allows us to analyze 
seven full business cycles, more than Weiser (2003) and Vrugt (2003).   
 
Table 7 
Average Returns by Stage of the Business Cycle 
 
 Stocks  Bonds  Commodity 
Futures 
Expansion  13.29% 6.74% 11.84% 
early  16.30% 9.98%  6.76% 
late  10.40% 3.63% 16.71% 
     
Recession  0.51% 12.59% 1.05% 
early  -18.64% -3.88%  3.74% 
late  19.69% 29.07% -1.63% 
 
Table 7 shows that:  
 
1.  On average, Stocks and Commodity Futures behave similar during expansions and 
recessions. The S&P500 averaged a 13.29% return during expansions, compared to 
11.84% for our equally weighted index of commodity futures. Over recessions, the 
average monthly annualized returns for the S&P and the equally weighted commodity 
futures are 0.51 % and 1.05%. 
 
Based on this observation, stocks and the commodity futures index appear to be very 
similar. But, these similarities obscure an important difference when the business cycles 
are broken in two parts as in Figure 6.    
 
2.  During the Early Recession phase the returns on both Stocks and Bonds are negative, 
–18.64% and –3.88% respectively.  But, the return on Commodity Futures is a 
positive 3.74%.  During the Late Recession phase the signs of the returns reverse, 
stocks and bonds are positive, while commodity futures are negative. 
 
3.  The diversification effect is not limited to the early stages of recessions. Whenever 
stock and bond returns are below their overall average, in the Late Expansion and 
Early Recession phases, commodity returns are positive and Commodity Futures 
outperform both Stocks and Bonds. 
 
                                                           
22 The NBER is a private, nonprofit, economic research consortium, which dates business cycles in the U.S. 
by identifying business cycle peaks and troughs.  See http://www.nber.org/cycles.html . 
  21These results are purely descriptive, and do not imply a trading strategy, because business 
cycles are dated “after-the fact.” However, the ex-post returns illustrate how commodity 
futures help to diversify traditional portfolios of stocks and bonds.  
 
 
9.  The Information Content of Futures Prices 
 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper is consistent with Keynes’ theory of 
normal backwardation. The notion of normal backwardation involves a comparison of the 
futures price to the expected spot price in the future, which is unobservable when the 
futures price is set. In the practice of commodity trading the term “backwardation” is 
commonly used to describe the basis of a futures position, which is defined as the 
difference between the current spot price and the futures price. Commodities for which 
the futures price exceeds the current spot price are said to be in “contango,” while 
commodity futures with a positive basis are referred to as being in backwardation. It is 
important to note that a positive basis is different from Keynesian “normal 
backwardation,” which relates the futures price to the expected future spot price. 
Commodities can be in contango (negative basis), yet be in “normal backwardation.”   
 
For example, assume as in our earlier example in Figure 1, that the current spot price of 
oil is $30.  But now let’s change the example and assume that market participants expect 
the future spot price to be $34, and that speculators and hedgers agree to set the futures 
price at $32, offering a $2 risk premium to speculators for assuming price risk. The 
market is in “normal backwardation” (futures below expected spot), but not 
backwardated in the second sense because the futures is above the current spot 
(contango). In order to avoid confusion, we will refer to the basis when comparing the 
futures price to the current spot price. 
 
What are the reasons for a commodity to have a positive basis? In Figure 1 we showed 
that by construction the basis is the sum of the expected spot return and the risk premium 
that buyers of futures investors expect to earn. So variation in the basis must be either due 
to variation in expectations about the future spot price or to variation in the expected risk 
premium. For example, a decline of the futures price relative to the current spot price will 
occur when market participants believe the future spot price to be lower, or when buyers 
of futures require a higher risk premium. The basis of a futures position is therefore not a 
source of return in itself, but movements in the basis may contain information about 
future expected returns. 
 
If there is no variation in required risk premiums either over time or across commodities, 
variation in the basis will simply reflect variation in market expectations about the future 
spot. In this scenario, a futures trading strategy that selects commodities conditional on 
their basis will not be profitable, because in an efficient market expected spot price 
movements are incorporated in the futures price. By contrast if variation in the basis 
mirrors differences in required risk premiums across commodities or the changing risk of 
  22a given commodity over time, a trading strategy that selects commodities according to the 
size of their basis can be expected to earn positive profits.
23  
 
In order to examine the information content of the basis for future returns, we conduct the 
following trading strategy. We calculate the basis of a futures position as the slope of the 
futures curve between in the contract in our index and the next available expiration.
24 At 
the end of each month in our sample, we rank all available commodity futures by their 
basis, and divide them into two equally-weighted portfolios (High and Low Basis). As 
the ranking of each commodity changes over time commodities might migrate between 
the Low and High Basis portfolios. Either way, the High (Low) Basis portfolio is 
constructed as to rebalance each month towards the half of the commodity universe with 
the highest (lowest) basis. The annualized monthly returns in deviation from the equally-
weighted index are summarized in the following Table. 
 
Table 8: Performance of High and Low Basis Portfolios 
Annualized Returns in Deviation from EW Index 1959/7-2004/12 
 
  High Basis - EW  Low Basis – EW  High - Low 
Average Return  4.87 -5.17  10.04 
Standard Deviation  6.64 6.64  13.16 
T-statistic  4.94 -5.26 5.15 
Sharpe ratio  0.73 -0.78 0.76 
% returns > 0  59 39 60 
 
Three observations stand out: 
 
1.  The High Basis portfolio has historically outperformed the Low Basis 
portfolio by about 10% per annum. Relative to the EW index, the out-
performance of the High basis portfolio is about equal to the 
underperformance of the Low basis portfolio. These performance 
differences are highly significant in a statistical sense. 
 
2.  The High Basis portfolio has on average beaten both the EW and the Low 
Basis portfolio in 3 out of every 5 months since 1959. 
 
3.  The historical standard deviation of the High–Low excess return is similar 
to the standard deviation of investing in the equally-weighted index itself. 
                                                           
23 Nash (2001) presents support for a relationship between average returns and the average basis. Fama and 
French (1987) show that between 1966 and 1984, the basis has been more informative about future spot 
rate movements than for the risk premium in a sample of 21 commodities. See also French (1986). 
24 If F1 is the futures price of the contract in our equally-weighted index, and F2 is the futures price of the 
next contract, the basis is calculated as [(F1−F2)/F1] × 365/(T2−T1), where T1 and T2 refer to the time (in 
days) to expiration of the two contracts. 
  23The Sharpe Ratio of a diversified long-short bet on the futures basis has 
been twice the Sharpe Ratio of the EW index. 
 
The conclusion from this section is that the futures basis seems to carry important 
information about the risk premium of individual commodities. Our simple trading 
strategy potentially exploits both differences in risk premiums across commodities as 
well as time series variation in the premiums of individual commodities. A detailed 
decomposition of the relative contribution of these components as well as the source of 




10.   Commodity Futures in an International Setting 
 
The majority of commodity futures in our index are traded on US exchanges – with the 
exception of some metals that are traded in London. Physical delivery takes place at a 
location within the contiguous 48 states, and settlement is in US dollars. The US markets 
for some commodity futures (gold, crude oil) are probably integrated with global 
markets, but prices of others are likely to be influenced by local conditions (natural gas, 
live hogs).  It is conceivable that a common country-specific US factor has positively 
influenced both stock and commodity futures returns in the US.  If that were the case, 
commodity futures might look quite different from the perspective of a foreign investor. 
Therefore, it is interesting to ask whether a Japanese or UK investor would draw the same 
conclusion as a US investor about the relative performance of these asset classes.  
 
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the performance of commodities from the perspective of UK 
and Japanese investors. The equity benchmarks we use are the total return indices from 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) for the UK and Japan, and the cumulative 
performance of long-term government bonds in both countries published by the 
International Monetary Fund. All indices are computed in local currency (GBP and 
YEN), and deflated by the local CPI-index. Similarly, for commodity futures we compute 




Three observations stand out from Figures 7 and 8: 
 
1.  Between 1970 and September of 2004 the historical performance of Commodity 
Futures has been similar to equities in both the UK and Japan. Commodity 
Futures have outperformed long-term government bonds.
26 
 
2.  Commodity Futures have outpaced local CPI inflation in the UK and Japan. 
 
 
                                                           
25 The collateral for the futures position is US T-bills. It is possible to collateralize the futures position by 
local T-bills. 
26 Japanese government bond data is only available through February 2004. 
  24Figure 7 
Inflation Adjusted Performance of Commodities in the UK 
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Figure 8 
Inflation Adjusted Performance of Commodities in JAPAN
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3.  The relative rankings of inflation-adjusted performance Stocks, Bonds, and 
Commodity Futures are similar in Japan, the UK, and the US.  
 
Our earlier conclusions about the relative performance of commodity futures have not 
been specific to the US experience. Foreign investors – evaluating performance in local 





11.   Commodity Futures vs. Stocks of Commodity Producing Companies 
 
It is sometimes argued that the equities of companies involved in producing commodities 
are a good way to gain exposure to commodities.  In fact, some argue that the stocks of 
such “pure plays” are a substitute for commodity futures.  We can examine this argument 
by constructing an index of the stock returns on such companies and then comparing the 
performance of this index to an equally weighted commodity futures index.  In order to 
make this comparison we need to identify companies that can be most closely matched 
with the commodities of interest. There is no obvious way to match companies with 
commodities since companies are almost never “pure plays,” but rather are involved in a 
number of businesses. We chose to match based on a simple rule, namely, with each 
commodity that can be associated with a four-digit SIC code, we take all the companies 
with that same four-digit SIC code.  On this basis we can match seventeen commodities 
with companies having publicly-traded stock.  The details are in Appendix 4. 
 
Figure 9 shows a significant difference between the average return of commodity futures 
and investment in commodity company stocks. Over the 41-year period between 1962 
and 2003 the cumulative performance of futures has exceeded the cumulative 
performance of “matching” equities. More interestingly, the correlation between the two 
investments has only been 0.40. By comparison, the correlation of the commodity 
company stocks with the S&P500 was 0.57. In other words, commodity company stocks 
behave more like other stocks than their counterparts in the commodity futures market. 
The conclusion of Figure 9 is that an investment in commodity company stocks has not 
been a close substitute for an investment in commodity futures. 
 
  26Figure 9 
Commodity Futures vs Shares of Commodity Companies












12.  Summary 
 
This paper provides evidence on the long-term properties of an investment in 
collateralized commodity futures contracts. We construct an equally-weighted index of 
commodity futures covering the period between July 1959 and December 2004. We show 
empirically that there is a large difference between the historical performance of 
commodity futures and the return an investor of spot commodities would have earned. An 
investor in our index of collateralized commodity futures would have earned an excess 
return over T-bills of about 5% per annum. During our sample period, this commodity 
futures risk premium has been about equal in size to the historical risk premium of stocks 
(the equity premium), and has exceeded the risk premium of bonds. This evidence of a 
positive risk premium to a long position in commodity futures is consistent with Keynes’ 
theory of “normal backwardation”. 
 
In addition to offering high returns, the historical risk of an investment in commodity 
futures has been relatively low – especially if evaluated in terms of its contribution to a 
portfolio of stocks and bonds. A diversified investment in commodity futures has slightly 
lower risk than stocks – as measured by standard deviation. And because the distribution 
of commodity returns is positively skewed relative to equity returns, commodity futures 
have less downside risk. 
 
  27Commodity futures returns have been especially effective in providing diversification of 
both stock and bond portfolios. The correlation with stocks and bonds is negative over 
most horizons, and the negative correlation is stronger over longer holding periods.  We 
provide two explanations for the negative correlation of commodity futures with 
traditional asset classes.  First, commodity futures perform better in periods of 
unexpected inflation, when stock and bond returns generally disappoint.  Second, 
commodity futures diversify the cyclical variation in stock and bond returns. 
 
On the basis of the stylized facts we have produced, two conclusions are suggested.  First, 
from the point of view of investors, the historical performance of collateralized 
investments in commodity futures suggests that they are an attractive asset class to 
diversify traditional portfolios of stocks and bonds.  Second, from the point of view of 
researchers, there are clearly challenges for asset pricing theory, which to date has 
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  31Appendix 1: Data and Return Calculation 
 
Construction of the Equally-Weighted Commodity Futures Index 
 
The equally-weighted index is constructed using Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) 
data (http://www.crbtrader.com/crbindex/ndefault.asp) and data from the London Metals 
Exchange.
27  The CRB data set covers all commodity futures that are in existence today.  
Commodity futures contracts that were introduced, but later discontinued – due to lack of 
liquidity – are not covered by the CRB, and are not included in the equally-weighted 
index.  As discussed in the main text, this omission is a type of survivor bias, but is 
fundamentally different from survivor bias in other asset classes, like mutual funds and 
stocks.  In other asset classes, assets disappear because they had low returns or failed. 
Consequently, calculating returns that omit these assets biases the returns upwards.  In 
the case of commodity futures, contract types do not disappear because of failure in the 
same sense.  Rather, there is a lack of liquidity, not low returns.  (See Black (1986) and 
Carlton (1984).) Therefore, this type of survivor bias is less of an issue here. 
 
Cash prices from actual transactions in commodities are not widely available for most 
commodities.  Given this lack of data, we construct daily spot prices by linear 
interpolation between the futures contract that is in the index and the next nearest futures 
contract. For contracts expiring after December 31, 2004 (index end date) we calculate 
expiration dates using current rules. Since rules, governing expiration dates, might have 
changed over time, for all contracts expiring prior to December 31, 2004 we use the latest 
date for which there is a price as the contract expiration date. For LME traded commodity 
futures we use the LME official “Cash” settlement ask price, which is really a two 
business day forward because physical settlement is in two business days.       
 
We construct the equally-weighted commodity futures index in steps.  
 
For each month we first construct price (or excess) returns on each commodity future 
using the nearest contract that does not expire in that month. In terms of a mechanical 
trading strategy, on the last business day of the month prior to the expiration date of a 
futures contract we roll into the next nearest futures contract. Then we compute the total 
returns assuming that the futures position is fully collateralized, marked-to-market on the 
monthly basis and earns interest on the monthly basis based on the total return of 30-day 
Treasury Bills provided by Ibbotson.  
 
Second, using monthly returns for each commodity futures contract, we construct the 
index by adding the monthly returns together each month and dividing by the number of 
commodities in the index that month.  A commodity enters the index on the last business 
day of the month following its introduction date except the first seven commodity futures 
entered the index on 07/01/59, not 07/31/59. This corresponds to monthly rebalancing.  
                                                           
27 We use the closing prices of the futures contracts for Aluminum, Nickel, Zinc, Lead and Tin expiring on 
the third Wednesday of each month. From July 1993 these prices were provided by Reuters (some of these 
prices, especially early in the period, may have been linearly interpolated). Prior to July 1993 we linearly 
interpolate between the official LME closing ask prices for cash and three month forward. 
. 
  32The table below shows the introduction dates of the commodities.  For Lean Hogs the 
contract specifications changed in 1996 from Live Hogs to Lean Hogs.  We construct a 
single series by dividing all Live Hogs prices by 0.74 – the constant was calculated by 
CRB based on the 1996 contract specification.  
 
For Pork Bellies during the months of 08/62, 09/62, 08/63 and 09/63 there were gaps 
during which no prices for any contracts were available. For Feeder Cattle on 3/73 and 
Rough Rice on 11/87 we were unable to roll into the next futures contract due to missing 
data. Finally, for Milk and 07/97 and Butter and 10/98 no single futures contract was 
available for the duration of the entire month. For these eight months we set price 
(excess) return to zero – in terms of mechanical trading strategy the index invested the 
money allocated to these commodities in 30 day Treasury Bills for these months.  
 







1 Copper  07/01/59  07/01/59  1959  10 Industrial  Metals 
2 Cotton  07/01/59  07/01/59  1960  7 Industrial  Materials 
3 Cocoa  07/01/59  07/01/59  1960  3 Softs 
4 Wheat  07/01/59  07/01/59  1959  12 Grains 
5 Corn  07/01/59  07/01/59  1959  9 Grains 
6 Soybeans  07/01/59  07/01/59  1959  9 Grains 
7 Soybean  Oil  07/01/59  07/01/59  1959  9 Grains 
8 Soybean  Meal  07/01/59  07/01/59  1959  12 Grains 
9 Oats  07/01/59  07/01/59  1959  12 Grains 
10 Sugar  01/04/61  01/31/61  1961  7 Softs 
11 Pork  Bellies  09/18/61  09/30/61  1962  2 Animal  Products 
12 Silver  06/12/63  06/30/63  1963  8 Precious  Metals 
13 Live  Cattle  11/30/64  11/30/64  1965  4 Animal  Products 
14 Lean  Hogs  02/28/66  02/28/66  1966  7 Animal  Products 
15 Orange  Juice  02/01/67  02/28/67  1967  5 Softs 
16 Platinum  03/04/68  03/31/68  1968  7 Precious  Metals 
17 Lumber  10/01/69  10/31/69  1970  3 Industrial  Materials 
18 Feeder  Cattle  11/30/71  11/30/71  1972  3 Animal  Products 
19 Coffee  08/16/72  08/31/72  1973  3 Softs 
20 Gold  12/31/74  12/31/74  1975  1 Precious  Metals 
21 Palladium  01/03/77  01/31/77  1977  3 Precious  Metals 
22 Zinc  01/03/77  01/31/77  1977  5 Industrial  Metals 
23 Lead  02/01/77  02/28/77  1977  6 Industrial  Metals 
24 Heating  Oil  11/14/78  11/30/78  1979  2 Energy 
25 Nickel  04/23/79  04/30/79  1979  8 Industrial  Metals 
26 Crude  Oil  03/30/83  03/31/83  1983  6 Energy 
27 Unleaded  Gas  12/03/84  12/31/84  1985  2 Energy 
28 Rough  Rice  08/20/86  08/31/86  1981  5 Grains 
29 Aluminum  06/01/87  06/30/87  1987  10 Industrial  Metals 
30 Propane  08/21/87  08/31/87  1987  12 Energy 
31 Tin  07/03/89  07/31/89  1989  9 Industrial  Metals 
32 Natural  Gas  04/04/90  04/30/90  1990  6 Energy 
33 Milk  01/11/96  01/31/96  1996  4 Animal  Products 
34 Butter  09/05/96  09/30/96  1997  2 Animal  Products 
  3335 Coal  07/12/01  7/31/01  2001  9 Energy 
36 Electricity  04/11/03  4/30/03  2003  6 Energy 
 
 
Portfolio Return Calculations 
 
Table 1 contains different average annualized return calculations.  We briefly explain 
these here; for some details see Roll (1983).  For simplicity we assume that all 
commodity futures contracts exist at all times.  Suppose N commodity futures each exist 
for T months, where Rit is one plus the return on a collateralized commodity future i 
during month t. 
 
The arithmetic average return on a monthly rebalanced portfolio over the T months is: 
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We annualize these returns subtract one and multiply by 1200 (i.e., 12 months x 100).  
The returns in the middle column of Table 1, Annual Rebalancing, are similar to formulas 
(1) and (2); these formulas are omitted. 
  34Appendix 2: Simple Commodity Futures Mathematics 
 
Compared to financial assets, commodity futures are different in several aspects. First, 
financial assets are held for investment purposes, while commodities are produced, and 
derive their value from their ultimate consumption or from their use as inputs into the 
production of finished goods. Second, commodities can be stored (to varying degrees), 
but this is often costly compared to financial assets. Finally, there is an active borrowing 
and lending market for financial assets, but less so for commodities.  As a consequence, 
spot prices of commodities behave differently from prices of financial assets. Financial 
asset prices are close to a random walk with drift, while commodity prices often fluctuate 
in a predictable manner due to seasonal patterns in demand and supply.   
 
The close link between futures prices and contemporaneous spot prices – known as the 
cost-of-carry model – that is necessary to prevent arbitrage in financial futures markets is 
not a good description of commodity markets. Specifically, the cost-of-carry model 
predicts that the futures (forward) price of an asset equals the spot price adjusted for the 
cost associated with carrying the asset into the future. Intuitively, this link derives from 
the equivalence between (1) purchasing an asset in the spot market and carrying it into 
the future, and (2) borrowing to finance the purchase the asset in the futures market. If the 
returns to these strategies differ, an arbitrageur can simultaneously sell the higher priced 
alternative and buy the cheaper alternative, thereby locking in an arbitrage profit. This is 
relatively easy in the case of financial assets, but is often more complicated for 
commodities, especially when the arbitrage strategy involves selling the asset spot. As a 




More formally, consider an investor who buys an asset in the spot market at time t (at a 
price S), incurs the net storage cost (w), and finances this transaction with a T-period 
loan. As a consequence the transaction does not require any cash at time t. If the investor 
simultaneously sells the commodity using futures for delivery at time T (at a price F), the 
net proceeds from the combined transaction are Ft,T  – e
r(T- t)[St + w].  
 
Transaction  Date t  Date T 
Buy 1 unit of commodity at Spot   – St  ST 
Pay Net Storage Costs  – w  0 
Borrow   St + w  – e
r(T- t)[St + w] 
Sell 1 commodity in Futures  0  Ft,T – ST 
    
Net Cash Flows  0  Ft,T – e
r(T- t)[St + w] 
 
 
This payoff has to be non-positive in order to ensure the absence of arbitrage 
opportunities:  
                                                           
28 For a more detailed textbook treatment of financial futures and commodity futures, see Hull (2002) or 
McDonald (2002). 
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Intuitively, the futures price cannot exceed the spot price by more than the cost of carry 
(storage plus interest) or there is arbitrage.  Unlike the case with financial futures, the 
above expression does not hold with equality because it is generally not possible to take 
advantage of a “low” futures price. Low futures prices (or high spot prices for that 
matter) create the incentive to sell the commodity spot and simultaneously buy back in 
the futures market. Those who do not own the commodity cannot borrow it, and those 
who possess an inventory of the commodity will be reluctant to give it up temporarily 
(either lend it or to sell it themselves and buy back forward), because inventory stock-
outs will lead to disruptions in the productive process to which the commodity is an 
input.  
 
  36Appendix 3:  
Summary statistics of distributions of individual commodity futures returns. 
Annualized monthly returns 1959/7 – 2004/12 
 
Average Correlation   Obs 
Arithmetic Geometric 
Stdev Skewness  Kurtosis 
w/ others  w/ Index 
EW Index  546  10.69%  9.98%  12.04%  0.71  4.54  0.39  1.00 
Copper 546  15.83%  12.16%  27.40%  0.46  2.71  0.15  0.42 
Cotton 546  8.01%  5.38%  23.27%  0.79  4.03  0.05  0.24 
Cocoa 546  8.95%  4.18%  31.59%  0.81  1.70  0.04  0.29 
Wheat 546  3.24%  0.74%  22.73%  0.88  4.11  0.14  0.53 
Corn 546  2.13%  -0.19%  22.16%  1.73  11.03  0.16  0.58 
Soybeans 546  8.99%  5.84%  26.02%  1.86  13.32  0.17 0.65 
Soybean Oil  546  13.53%  9.03%  31.28%  1.61  7.22  0.12  0.55 
Soybean Meal  546  13.85%  9.38%  31.67%  2.67  21.18  0.16  0.59 
Oats 546  2.63%  -1.22%  29.24%  2.92  28.72  0.09  0.45 
Sugar 527  11.28%  2.12%  44.58%  1.23  3.47  0.05  0.37 
Pork Bellies  519  9.66%  3.35%  35.98%  0.52  1.65  0.10  0.40 
Silver 498  7.53%  2.83%  31.60%  1.87  17.98  0.14  0.47 
Live Cattle  481  13.00%  11.39%  17.96%  -0.24  1.93  0.10  0.35 
Lean Hogs  466  15.37%  11.81%  26.78%  0.13  1.55  0.13  0.44 
Orange Juice  454  11.15%  6.30%  32.76%  2.06  10.92  -0.02  0.12 
Platinum 441  10.02%  6.06%  28.49%  0.69  4.38  0.15  0.51 
Lumber 422  6.26%  1.91%  29.80%  0.46  1.48  0.04  0.20 
Feeder Cattle  397  9.40%  7.90%  17.17%  -0.55  3.01  0.07  0.26 
Coffee 388  15.11%  7.68%  39.95%  1.10  2.75  0.04  0.22 
Gold 360  4.48%  2.65%  19.34%  0.72  4.73  0.13  0.47 
Palladium 335  13.12%  6.67%  36.24%  0.45 2.65 0.13 0.49 
Zinc   335  8.41%  5.99%  22.11%  0.14  0.27  0.13  0.45 
Lead 334  7.31%  4.78%  22.74%  0.45  0.46  0.13  0.42 
Heating Oil  313  18.62%  13.62%  32.74%  1.24  5.54  0.11  0.38 
Nickel 308  16.28%  10.51%  36.83%  3.38  28.96  0.10  0.35 
Crude Oil  261  20.67%  15.24%  33.59%  0.64  3.21  0.11  0.45 
Unleaded Gas  240  24.29%  18.73%  34.49%  1.00  3.35  0.11  0.49 
Rough Rice  220  -1.21%  -5.59%  30.42%  1.25  5.17  0.03  0.17 
Aluminum 210  6.44%  3.72%  24.07%  1.55  8.19  0.10  0.41 
Propane 208  30.25%  20.61%  49.40%  4.07  36.00  0.08  0.42 
Tin 185  2.46%  0.91%  17.77%  0.54  2.69  0.11  0.37 
Natural Gas  176  14.50%  1.70%  51.93%  0.69  1.08  0.07  0.41 
Milk 107  5.81%  3.93%  19.42%  -0.11  0.96  -0.01  -0.01 
Butter 99  24.73%  17.06%  40.06%  0.50  1.34  0.01  0.12 
Coal 41  -2.04%  -4.47%  22.01%  -0.52  0.76  0.16  0.55 
Electricity 20  -46.73%  -54.56%  40.24%  0.44 -0.83  0.09 0.44 
 
This table summarizes the number of monthly observations, and the average annualized 
arithmetic and geometric average returns for the equally-weighted index and individual 
commodity futures. The next columns report the standard deviation of returns, the 
skewness and the kurtosis. The last two columns give the average pair-wise correlations 
of individual commodity futures with all other commodities and the correlation of a 
commodity future with the equally-weighted index. 
  37Appendix 4: Matching Commodity-Producing Firms to Commodities 
 
As mentioned in the main text, we chose to match companies with commodities based on 
associating with each commodity future a four-digit SIC code. We then search the 
University of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices monthly stock database for 
all the companies with that same four-digit SIC code. On this basis we can match 17 
commodities with companies having publicly-traded stock.   For all companies with same 
SIC code we form the equally weighted monthly stock return series, and then using these 
series we form the equally weighted commodity-producing firms stock index. 
Commodities are included in the futures index during the same months as the 
corresponding stocks enter the equity index. 
 
There were several exceptions to the general rule.  In the case of Palladium, we looked at 
SIC codes 1099 and 1090, i.e., Misc. Metal Ores. This category includes companies 
mining palladium, but it also includes companies mining uranium and other metals.   
From the list of all these companies we found two palladium mining companies, namely, 
North American Palladium (PAL) and Stillwater Mining (SWC); the remaining 
companies were ruled out. 
 
Silver does not occur in a pure form.  It is usually found as a byproduct of gold and 
copper ores or lead and zinc ores.  SIC code 1044 “Silver Ores” contains very few stocks, 
especially in the recent period. There is, however, an SIC code 1040 – “Gold and Silver 
Ores”.  There are about 200 stocks with this SIC code. Among these stocks we were able 
to identify several companies specifically focusing on silver – Pan American Silver 
(PAAS), Silver Standard Resources (SSRI), Apex Silver Mines Ord (SIL), Helca Mining 
(HL), and Coeur d’Alene Mines (CDE).  These stocks were added to silver stocks.  The 
rest of the stocks in the 1040 SIC code “Gold and Silver Ores” were added to gold stocks. 
 
In the case of Milk, we looked at SIC code 2020.  From the SIC code 2020 “Dairy 
Products” we excluded all stocks that we could identify as ice cream producers – these 
are consumers of milk, not producers of milk.  The remainder was taken as Milk stocks. 
 
The table below provides the detail on the number of stocks for each commodity and the 
period covered.  If there are zero stocks, then that commodity was not included because 




  38Summary of Matches of Companies to Commodities 
 
Commodity       
     
         
                   
                   
             
                   
           
               
            
           
            
         
           
              
       
                   
Start End Matching  SIC
Codes 



















  Natural Gas  04/30/90  12/31/03  1310; 1311   Crude Petroleum and 
Gas Extraction 
12/31/25 12/31/03 297 04/30/90 12/31/03
Crude Oil  03/31/83  12/31/03  2910; 2911  Petroleum Refining  12/31/25  12/31/03 137  03/31/83  12/31/03     
Unleaded 
Gas 
12/31/84  12/31/03  2910; 2911  Petroleum Refining  12/31/25  12/31/03 137  11/30/84  12/31/03     
Heating Oil  11/30/78  12/31/03  2910; 2911  Petroleum Refining  12/31/25  12/31/03 137 
 
11/30/78  12/31/03     
Live Cattle  12/31/64  12/31/03  212; 5154  Beef cattle except 
feedlots; Livestock 
8/31/83 3/31/86 2 08/31/83 03/31/86 3/31/02 12/31/03
Lean Hogs 
 
02/28/66  12/31/03  213  Hogs      0         
Wheat 07/01/59  12/31/03 111 Wheat 0







  Soybeans 07/01/59  12/31/03 116 Soybeans 0
Soybean Oil 
 
07/01/59  12/31/03  2075  Soybean Oil Mills  7/31/01  12/31/03 2  07/31/01  12/31/03     
Aluminum
 
06/30/87 12/31/03 3334 Primary  Aluminum 8/31/91 12/31/03 6 8/31/91 12/31/03
Copper 07/01/59  12/31/03  1020;  1021;
3331 
  Copper ores; Primary 
Copper 
7/31/62 12/31/03 43 07/31/62 12/31/03
Zinc  01/31/77  12/31/03  1030;1031 
 
Lead and Zinc Ores 
 
7/31/62  1/31/02  22  12/31/76  01/31/02     
Nickel 04/30/79  12/31/03 1061 Ferroalloy  ores
except vanadium 
7/31/62 12/31/03 9 04/30/79 12/31/03
Lead  02/28/77  12/31/03  1030;1031 
   
Lead and Zinc Ores  7/31/62  1/31/02  22  01/31/77  01/31/02     
Tin 07/31/89  12/31/03 0
Gold  12/31/74  12/31/03  1041;1040  Gold ores; Gold and 
silver ores 
2/28/86 12/31/03 299 02/28/86 12/31/03
Silver 06/30/63  12/31/03  1044;  1040
 







  Platinum 03/31/68  12/31/03 0
Sugar  01/31/61  12/31/03  2061;2063  Raw cane sugar; Beet 
sugar 
7/31/62 12/31/03 15 07/31/62 12/31/03











  Coffee 08/31/72  12/31/03 0
Cocoa 07/01/59  12/31/03 0  40
             
           
             
               
                   
             
           
Lumber 10/31/69  12/31/03  2400;  2410;
2411; 810; 811
  Lumber and Wood 
Products; Logging; 
Timber tracts 
2/28/27 12/31/03 19 10/31/69 12/31/03
Propane  08/31/87  12/31/03  1320; 1321 
 








   
Butter 09/30/96  12/31/03 2021 Creamery  butter 0
Milk 01/31/96  12/31/03  240;  241;
2026; 2020 
 
  Dairy farms; Fluid 
milk; Dairy products 
 
12/31/25 12/31/03 35 01/31/96 12/31/03
Orange 
Juice 
02/28/67 12/31/03 174 Citrus  fruits 9/30/70 11/30/99 4 09/30/70 11/30/99
Oats  07/01/59  12/31/03  119  Cash grains, n.e.c.      0         
Rough Rice  08/31/86  12/31/03  112  Rice  7/31/73  7/31/99  1  08/31/86  07/31/99     
Soybean 
Meal 
07/01/59 12/31/03 2075 Soybean  Oil  Mills 7/31/01 12/31/03 2 07/31/01 12/31/03
Feeder 
Cattle 
11/30/71  12/31/03  211; 5154  Beef cattle, feedlots; 
Livestock 
12/31/69 9/30/88 4 11/30/71 09/30/88
Pork Bellies  09/30/61  12/31/03  213  Hogs      0         
Palladium  01/31/77  12/31/03  PAL; SWC  Selected from 1090, 
1099 Misc Metal 
Ores 
11/30/93 12/31/03 2 11/30/93 12/31/03
 